Experience in the design of external protection systems against lightning by Arnera, Patricia Liliana et al.
V International Symposium 
on Lightning Protection 
17'' - 21" May, 1999 Sao Paulo - Brazil 
EXPERIENCE IN THE DESIGN OF EXTE~AL PROTECTION SYSTEMS 
AGAINST LIGH1.]NING 
Ing. Patricia Arnera 
IITREE - UNLP 
Ing. Julieta Vemieri 
IITREE - UNLP 
Ing. Beatriz Barbieri 
IITREE - UNLP 
IITREE- UNLP (Universidad Nacional de La Plata) - 4~y 116 (1900) La Plata -ARGENTINA 
TE - Fax: +t54 221 4836640 / 4837017 I 4250804 
E-mail: iitree@volta.ing.unlp.edu.ar- http:\\~.iitree.ing.unlp.edu.ar 
Abstract - This paper describes the experience acquired 
during the revision and determination of external 
lightning protection systems in some refinery plants, in 
Argentina. With this purpose a program, developed by 
IITREE, based on the Monte Carlo statistical technique, 
was used, among other things, to determine in a period of 
time the frequency of lightning flashes to structures. 
International and American standards were used as 
reference. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In Argentina, nowadays and during the last few years 
people, in a less scale politic leaders and important 
industries, concern about damage that many 
technologies and current way of life are causing to the 
environment Among industries some refineries are not 
only concerned about real risk, but loss of social 
prestige. One agent that could cause high damage 
(material and life losses) is the lightning phenomena, 
especially in such plants where flammable products are 
being manipulated and processed. 
2 REVISION OF CURRENT STANDARDS 
2.1 Current standards as reference 
Standards usually provide information concerning 
design, construction and materials of Lightning 
Protection Systems (LPS), however they say nothing 
about necessity of installation of an LPS. Standards of 
application in Argentina are: !RAM 2184-1 (1996) [l) 
and !RAM 2184-1-1 (1997) [2), with the respective 
modifications and all complementary !RAM standards. 
Mentioned standards are based on, and equal in 
contents, IEC 1024-1 (1990) [3) and IEC 1024-1-1 
(1993) [4) international standards. 
Generally in Argentina and especially in territories 
where the refineries in study are located, there are no 
local regulations that oblige the installation of LPS. Only in 
Buenos f.ires City there is an obligatory regulation 
(N" 1411-PGFOC-98) that demands protection by installing 
LPS in accordance with !RAM 2184-1 and 2184-1-1 
standards! . . 
i 
Cousiderihg the fact that !RAM standards are based on IEC 
standardsJ IEC 1024-1 and its sections (IEC 1024-1-1, IEC 
61024-1-t [5)), as fur as the American NFPA-780 [6], were 
used as cip:rent standards of reference. 
i 
2.2 Z<1nes of protection 
lEC-1024}-l and NFPA-780 standards alter from protective 
angle, and rolling sphere criteria when assessing proper 
locations for air terminals. 
IEC defuies values for protective angle, and rolling sphere 
for each \ corresponding protection level and regarding 
structure peight, as it can be seen in Table l, where h is 
height of the structure to be protected in metres, a protective 
angle and1R rolling sphere radius in metres. 
As you can see in this table, for structures higher than 20 
metres, depending on the desired level of protection, 
protective angle method is not applicable. On the other hand, 
rolling sphere method is always · applicable, no matter 
structure size, height, shape, etc. 
Table I: Positioning of air-termination according to the protection levels 
(!EC 1024-1). 
PROTECTION h(m) 20 30 45 60 
LEVEL 
R(m) a,(O) a,(O) cx10) a,(O) 
I 20 25 * * * 
II 30 35 25 * * 
III 45 45 35 25 * 
IV 60 55 45 35 25 
* In these cases only apply rolling sphere. 
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As the protective angle method establishes, the zone of 
protection forms a cone having an apex at the highest 
point of the air terminal, with walls forming an angle 
from the vertical. 
As the rolling sphere method determines, the zone of 
protection includes the space not intruded by a rolling 
sphere when it lays tangent to earth and rests against a 
lightning protection terminal. 
3 ADOPTED CRITERIA FOR PROTECTION 
3.1 Classification of typical installations 
In order to determine external protection sy!\(ems 
against lightning, it was necessary to classify different 
existing structures into representative types, and adopt 
some criteria applicable to protection of each one. 
I 
The following structure classification was done: 
TYPE 1) buildings in administrative areas, 'friE 2) 
buildings immerse in process plants, TYPE 3) 
recipients containing flanunable vapours, flanujmble 
gases, or liquids that can give off flammable vapours 
(tanks and pools). 
TYPE 1) Buildings located in non-dangerous lireas, 
usually are made of concrete, or in some case$ are 
I 
made of metal sheets. Almost all of them cait be 
classified as common structures. i 
TYPE 2) In process plants yon may accept the pre5ence 
of explosive atmosphere, because of the fl~able 
substances being manipulated. Strippers, rebo/lers, 
columns, reactors, compressors, charge heaters, 
coolers, condensers, refrigeration towers, motors) etc. 
are typical equipment in these areas. Also electric 
substations and other buildings can be found iin a 
process area, usually, not containing flamriiable 
substances. 
TYPE 3) Storage recipients, containing petroleunt and 
petroleum products are made of metal and the great 
majority are thick enough not to be punctured jby a 
direct strike and are normally well grounded sq that 
they do not require lightning protection. However, in 
some of the refineries being analysed metallic tlmks, 
•· I 
although having enough metal thickness no tp be 
punctured, suffer from lack of maintenance al)d in 
some cases show holes where flanunable vapoutj; can 
give off. Consequently, lightning protection will be 
required in such tanks. In addition, usual open-air Pools 
~=::::!, flanunable vapour will require lighf"ing 
3.2 Assessment of required efficiency for LPS designs 
Once structure classification has been adopted, section 3.1, 
we assigned a recommended protection level for each type 
of structure. The pwpose of selecting a protection level is to 
reduce, below the maximum tolerable level, the risk of 
damage by direct lightning flash to a structure, or to a 
volume to be protected. 
Applying IRAM 2841-1-1 standard (based on IEC 1024-1-
1 ), we classified refineries as structures dangerous to their 
surroundings where the effects of lightning could be fire and 
explosion in the plant and its surroundings. 
Applying NFP A 780 standard we can classify some of the 
typical refinery installations as structures containing 
flammable vapours, flammable gases, or liquids that can 
give off flammable vapours. 
In order to determine the proper protection level, we 





Where Nd is the average annual frequency of lightning 
flashes to the structures and Ne is the maximum accepted 
annual frequency of lightning flashes which can cause 
damage to each type of structures, estimated in accordance 
with IRAM. 2841-1-1 and ENV 61024-1 (European 
standard) as follows: 
5.5·10- 3 
Ne= C [flashes/year] (2) 
Where C was calculate with the following equation: 
(3) 
C, : coefficient that evaluates type of construction of the 
structure. 
C3 : coefficient that evaluates structure contents. 
C4 : coefficient that evaluates structure occupancy. 
Cs : coefficient that evaluates consequences of a direct 
stroke to the structure in the surroundings. 
Nd is calculated as a product of the local ground stroke 
density Ng and the equivalent collection area Ae of the 
structure: 
-6 Nd=C1 ·Ng·Ae·IO (4) 
Where c, is an environmental coefficient taking into. 
account relative location of the structure. 
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Table 2: Parameter values used to calculate Efficiency Ee, for. each 
type of structure. 
Common Buildings Tanks Pools 
buildings in process 
plants 
ITYPE l' ITYPE2) (TYPE3 1Yl'E3) 
Ae lm"l 2860 2860 10936 2534 
CI I 0.25 I 0.25 
Nd [fish 0.0088 0.0022 0.0385 0.0022 
I yearl . 
C2 I 1 0.5 3 
C3 0.5 1 3 3 
C4 3 1 0.5 0.5 
cs 1 10 10 10 
c 1.5 10 7.5 45 
Nc[flsh 0.0037 0.0006 0.0007 0.0001 
I vear] 
Table 3: Calculated efficiency Ee, and efficiency E corresponding 
with protection levels. 





Expressions applied to obtain Ae, given in the 
standard, are: 
Rectangnlar area Ae = ab+ 6h (a+b) + 9 11 h2 (5) 
Roundarea Ae = 11 (¢12 + 3h)2 (6) 
Where a and b are the object length and width 
respectively, h is the object height, and ip is the circle 
radius. 
Typical structure dimensions assumed are as it follows: 
TYPE 1) common building: a = 20 m, b = 20 m 
andh=6m. 
TYPE 2) building in process plants: a = 20 m, 
b = 20 mandh = 6 m. 
TYPE 3) tanks: ¢= 23 m and h = 12 m. 
TYPE 3) open-air pools: a = 56 m, b = 35 m and 
h = 1 m for railing height rounding the pool. 
Quantities indicated in Tables 3 and 4, were used to 
calculate the required efficiency for each type of 
structure classified as we proposed in section 3.1. 
The adopted value for ground flash density Ng was 3.5 
flashes per km2/year, corresponding to La Plata region, 
obtained from reference [7]. 
3.3 Adopted protection method 
Considering , clients preoccupation in relation with 
enviromuental impact and social consequences, protection 
levels selected were more severe, when possible, than the 
smaller ones 'coming from the following equation: 
• Ne E;;,:&=1--
i Nd I 
(7) 
Rolling sphere method was employed to design alternative 
LPSs, and the following protection levels were proposed for 
the previous 'structure classification: 
I 
Protection level I, and additional protection measures 
(R = 20 lm), were applied to Type 3 structures: tanks and 
pools contaiuingflammable vapours, flammable gases, 
I 
or liqui(ls that con give off flammable vapours. 
Protecdon level II, R = 30 m, was applied to Type 2 
structurl:s: buildings located in process plants, such as 
electric I substations, control rooms, dressing rooms, 
refrigeration towers, etc. 
I 
Protecfion level IIL R = 45 m: was applied to Type 1 
struc~s: common buildings located in administrative 
areas ,and other non-dangerous areas, such as 
managtjment, laboratories, medicines, etc. 
3.4 An~ysis of the selected protection level 
Comparing iboth standards, NFP A 780 defines the zone of 
protection for common stnictures with a rolling sphere 
having a rlidius of 46 metres (150 ft) in accordance with 
protection level III as lEC 1024-1-1 defines. This is a good 
reason for c~oosing level III for Type 3 structures. 
I 
In the samd way, NFPA 780 defines the zone of protection 
for structu1-es contaiuing flammable vapours, flammable 
gases, or liquids that can give off flammable vapours with a 
rolling sph~re having a radius of 30 metres (100 ft), in 
accordance:with protection level II as lEC 1024-1-1 defines. 
Trying to satisfy client concern, about social impact, level I 
was recommended for such structures (Type 3). 
4 APPLICATION OF THE ANALYSIS TOOL 
4.1 The computer program 
A computer program developed by IITREE called 
BLINSUB, assists in determining the objects beiug struck 
when a number of lightning flashes moving downward a 
region are simulated. It employs the Monte Carlo statistical 
technique to select lightning by means of an external file 
with an empirical distribution for current amplitude, and 
chooses flash origin points with a uuiforrn distribution. 
It was useful to analyse present lightning performance of 
refineries. This tool is based on the electrogeometric model 
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of the lightning process. According to this model the 
striking distance of a lightning stroke is expressed as a 
function of the stroke current, as it is given by the 
following most frequently accepted expression: 
Where: 
R: striking distance in metres 
I: stroke current in kA 
k, n: empirical constants 
(8) 
4.2 Data from installations of the refineries 
Significant data research was performed in each 
refinery. This task turned very large and heavy, as a 
consequence of data being not available, and: because 
of many difficulties faced especially in some ryfineries. 
Characteristics of refinery installations ~ch as 
dimensions, height, construction materials, thickness, 
location, contents, and so on, were relevan' for the 
studies. In addition, visual inspection accomplished 
during several visits to the installations c6mpleted 
missing data. t 
Once the collection of data was made, eachl element 
was represented, for simulations with BpNSUB 
program, as a parallelepiped with four €artesian 
coordinates and height over soil level (Figure 1). 
4.3 Protection characteristics 
; 
BLINSUB program requires a categorising of *1J of the 
elements being represented. This categorising :is based 
upon its characteristics facing a lightning strike. 
Elements had to be categorised as objects btiing se!f-
protecting or as objects to be protected. i 
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Figure 1: Elements representation from YPF La Plata refitjery tanks 
area i 
Some of the following considerations were useful to 
accomplish previous categorising: 
metallic tanks, vessels, and process equipment that 
contain flammable liquids or gas under pressure 
normally do not require lightoing protection, siuce such 
equipment is well shielded from electrical strikes. 
Equipment of this type is normally well grounded and is 
thick enough no to be punctured by a direct strike. They 
can be considered as objects being self-protecting. 
metallic tanks that had not been maintained in good 
conditions cannot be considered as self-protecting 
objects. Holes over the roof can be responsible for 
flammable concentrations of vapour or gas that can 
result in a fire or explosion as a consequence of a 
lightoing direct stroke. 
metallic tanks used for storage flanunable substances at 
atmospheric pressure, not necessarily have thickness 
enough to withstand a direct strike without being 
punctured. Hence they were considered as objects to be 
protected in simulations with realistic hypothesis. 
4.4 Simulation of different cases 
In order to study refinery lightning performance different 
conditions were simulated considering, or not, self-
protecting behaviour of certain iustallations, and 
considering, or not, presence of existing lightoing rods. 
Different hypothesis were assumed, consequently different 
cases were analysed. The "most pessimistic" hypothesis is 
the one that ignores any existing lightning rods and any self-
protecting object. Then all probable combinations were , 
made. 
Large number of lightning strikes was simulated falling over 
every refinery represented, for each determined case. The 
proper number of lightoing strikes was calculated choosing a 
sufficiently long period of time, and by means of the average 
ground flash density Ng. 
For lightning stroke current amplitude, the program uses a 
statistical distribution curve based on empirical data. 
The adopted values of k and n constants of equation (8) were 
10 and 0.65 respectively . 
4.5 Simulation to analyse protection levels 
Tilis program was also useful to analyse protection levels. It 
reproduces the rolling of a sphere over the contour of each 
element represented in the simulated area To perform this 
simulation, an external file with one defined value for 
current amplitude should be used. According to the 
electrogeometric model, equation (8), the radius of the 
sphere, which is correlated with the desired protection level, 
defines the stroke current amplitude. 
Such kind of deterministic simulations were accomplished 
for the three protection levels selected. 
Unfortunately this program do not permit vary strike 
incidence angle, hence every flash simulated is right vertical. 
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Figure 2: Output from the simulation in the YPF La Plata refinery 
tanks area 
Actually, structures being taller than the sphere radius 
could be struck if they don't have lateral protection. 
However, simulations performed with the BLINSUB 
program, will not declare lateral strokes on them. 
4.6 Simulation results 
The period being chosen for statistical simulations was 
3.000 years. It became enough since changes in the 
sequence of flashes produce no difference in results. 
Results obtained from the simulations were given in 
two ways. One of them, by means of a map with all the 
elements being represented and marks indicating 
lightning strokes to elements categorised as objects to 
be protected. The program was set to omit showing 
lightning strokes to earth in the map. 
By way of illnstration, Figure 2 shows the output-map 
that indicates flashes striking elements categorised as 
objects to be protected. Compare this map with Figure 
l, where you can see all the elements being 
represented. 
Another output of the program is a list of each flash 
striking to objects to be protected and ignores either 
lightning strokes to self-protecting elements and 
lightning strokes to earth. The list indicates for each 
stroke: origin flash coordinates, stroke current 
amplitude, and the element being struck. 
4.7 LPS proposed designs 
Some LPS designs were proposed for either open air 
pools emanating flammable vapour, and metallic tanks 
requiring lightning protection, as they appeared to be 
the most dangerous structures of refinery installations. 
Proposed designs consist in two basic types: one 
performed with overhead ground wires and the another 
with four single masts. All of these designs were 
calculated for a protection level I, applying the rolling 
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Figure;4: LPS four single masts design for protection of tanks. 
All exterru'1 LPS proposed were isolated from the space to 
be protect$, in order to avoid the ignition of any flammable 
air-vapour! mixture in the tank or pool surroundings, as a 
consequenee of great heat developed along the lightning 
channel. 
ln order to verify the protected zone defined by the LPS 
proposed deterministic simulations with BLINSUB program 
were perfohned (rolling sphere method). 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
At the moment, great investments in industrial areas 
such as refineries in order to reduce lightning damage 
are consequence of lack of lightning considerations 
during planning and designing periods in the past As a 
result concern in prevention against lightning is 
increasing nowadays. 
Bad or poor maintenance especially in tanks and 
process plant equipment is another possible cause of 
future losses associated with lightning strokes. 
An urgent solution is needed to prevent risky 
consequence in open-air pools containing flammable 
products. A different pool design, inherently self-
protecting, is recommendable for future 
installations. 
BLINSUB program resulted an acceptable tool to 
detennine the frequency of lightning flashes to 
each structure located in the refinery being 
represented in the simulation. It also allows 
reproducing a sphere rolling over all exposed 
surfaces. 
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